Check for updates

Preventing Avoidable Deaths in Police Encounters with Citizens: Immediate Priorities

By
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN

The global problem of fatal encounters between police and citizens is a massive challenge for both public health and public safety. This volume focuses on a wide range of ideas and evidence about what might be done to save lives in police-citizen encounters, at least in the United States. I focus on three ideas that could make the most difference, most quickly. Each of the ideas is supported by both substantial research evidence and a feasibility assessment of which ideas might be adopted. Three ideas that can transcend political gridlock, appeal to both supporters and critics of the American police, and appeal to police officers themselves are presented: (1) empowering police to take away legally possessed guns from manifestly dangerous people, (2) supporting police in emergency first aid and medical treatment of anyone who is injured by gunfire, and (3) developing implementation strategies based on research on the interactional tactics associated with fatalities and their prevention.

Keywords: police; deadly force; prevention; first aid; shooting victims; red flag laws

The global narrative of fatal police shootings has continued to intensify in the two years this volume has been in production. As the volume goes to press, the *New York Times* reports that Brazilian police kill at least sixty-two hundred people a year, or ten times as many deaths per million population (thirty) as in the United States (three) (Ahmed 2019). The police of Hyderabad, in India's newest state of Telangana, shot to death four suspects in a horrific rape/murder case (Gettleman 2019). Both Brazilian

Lawrence W. Sherman is director of the Cambridge Centre for Evidence-Based Policing Ltd., where he serves as editor-in-chief of the Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing*. He is also Wolfson Professor of Criminology Emeritus at the University of Cambridge Institute of Criminology, where he is chair of the Cambridge Police Executive Programme. Until 2019, he served as a distinguished university professor at the University of Maryland.*

Correspondence: ls434@camb.ac.uk

DOI: 10.1177/0002716220904048

and Hyderabadi police were praised by many citizens for such "speedy justice" that makes communities "safer." In an era in which maintaining a rule of law faces increasing challenges, fatal police shootings in the United States must be seen in a context of contestability. A political consensus about when police should and should not be allowed to kill citizens seems to be in short supply.

Yet seeking political consensus is the only way democracy can work. Since 1889, *The ANNALS* has used its pages to seek such consensus, on issues ranging from racial equality to preventing war with Japan. It is fitting to close this volume with the three proposals from these pages that seem to have the greatest chance of winning a political consensus, and then winning implementation. Each one should save lives of minorities, majorities, police, the mentally ill, and the most dangerous people at large in U.S. communities. These proposals are

1) to empower police to seize guns without a court order, as may appear necessary to them in a "split-second decision";
2) to develop the core tactics underlying systems that seek to reduce "tight coupling" that creates "split-second decisions" and leave too little time to save lives; and
3) to equip police with more powerful first aid strategies, from hi-tech bandages in every police car to policies enabling police to "scoop and run" with every shooting or stabbing victim.

Each of these proposals *could* be endorsed by a wide range of political interests, even if there is no guarantee that they *would* be. But the potential is great for all of them, since they could save police lives as well as citizens'.

The Indiana "Red Flag" Law: In Jake Laird's Memory

> Here's how it works: Even without a warrant or judge's signature, police can temporarily confiscate firearms from people who are threatening to harm themselves or others. (Martin 2019)

On the evening of August 18, 2004, residents of a Southside Indianapolis neighborhood called 911 to report that a man was walking down Dietz Street, firing an assault rifle (Mack 2019). Police were dispatched to the scene, even before they knew that the 33-year-old shooter, Kenneth Charles Anderson, had already shot his mother to death in her home. Nor did they know that just eight months earlier, Indianapolis officers had confiscated Anderson's cache of weapons when putting him under "immediate attention" due to his mental health. He was reportedly diagnosed on January 20, 2004, as schizophrenic, when police seized nine guns and more than two hundred bullets. At that time, he said that his two brothers and their families had been murdered, and that the murderers were coming for him and his mother next. None of that was true.

Absent any legal basis for having seized Anderson's property, Indianapolis Police decided they had to return the guns and ammunition to him in March 2004.

After several days of increasing signs of distress, Anderson walked out of his house after dark and started shooting. The 911 calls poured in, and multiple police units were dispatched. When police arrived, he started shooting at their cars, wounding four out of six officers who responded. The third officer to arrive was 31-year-old Timothy "Jake" Laird. Shooting from a concealed location, Anderson's bullet hit Jake Laird fatally just above his bullet-proof vest line.

Returning fire despite being wounded, SWAT officer Peter Koe then shot Anderson fatally and ended the encounter with three dead: Anderson, his mother, and Officer Laird.

Arguably, not one of those fatalities would have occurred had there been a system in place to separate a diagnosed schizophrenic from his guns and bullets. That is just what the Indiana legislature concluded. In 2005, the General Assembly voted to approve the "Jake Laird Law" by overwhelming margins. The House vote was 91-0 in favor; the Senate vote was 48-1.

"Red Flag" laws and police powers

After the mass shootings in El Paso, Texas, and Dayton, Ohio, in summer 2019, President Trump issued a statement:

> "We must make sure that those judged to pose a grave risk to public safety do not have access to firearms and that if they do those firearms can be taken through rapid due process," Trump said, according to *USA TODAY*. "That is why I have called for red flag laws, also known as extreme risk protection orders." (Martin 2019)

The U.S. Congress has yet to pass a federal "red flag" law (as of late 2019), and it is not clear that President Trump would actually sign such a bill if Congress did pass one. But the mere discussion of the proposal came closer to action than any recent proposal for federal endorsement of more local police powers, especially about guns. With support from such Republican senators as Lindsey Graham and Marco Rubio, as well as Republican members of the U.S. House of Representatives, the mere usage of the phrase "red flag law" seemed to soar that summer, even without clarity about what such a law means.

What it always does seem to mean (T. Williams 2019) is that the government can somehow take weapons away from people who possess them legally, if they are shown to pose an "extreme risk." What it seems *not* to mean anywhere but in Indiana is a police power to seize a gun without a court order, immediately and on the spot, with the burden on the gun owner to recover it from the police.

The distinction is crucial. The Indiana version can reduce extreme risk immediately. All other red flag laws require a court order and give up to several weeks for courts to decide. As Officer Jake Laird's death proves, many people can die very quickly if such lengthy delays are allowed.

There are many different forms of red flag laws; all these laws, however, are so different from Indiana's Jake Laird Law that they should not even have the same name. Names of such red flag laws include extreme risk protection orders (ERPOs) (in Oregon, Washington, Maryland, and Vermont), risk protection

orders (in Florida), gun violence restraining orders (GVROs) (in California), risk warrants (in Connecticut), and proceedings for the seizure and retention of a firearm (in Indiana). I use the term *red flag laws* here to start a discussion, but I propose a new and better name: a "safety first law."

A red flag law is often defined as any gun control law that allows a *court* to order the temporary removal of firearms from anyone who appears inclined to use it illegally. These definitions include the requirement that a judge should decide to issue the order, not the police acting alone.

How is the Indiana law different from this generic description? This is how the *Indianapolis Star* described the way that the Jake Laird Law has worked since its enactment in 2005:

> It works by allowing police to temporarily confiscate firearms from people who are threatening to harm themselves or others without a warrant or judge's signature. After the warrantless seizure, the officer who recognizes the potential red flags has to submit a written statement to the court describing why the person is considered dangerous. Judges have 14 days to review seizures, and gun owners can fight it in in court. If a judge finds that probable cause exists, the law enforcement agency can retain custody of the guns. If not, the firearms are returned. (Mack 2019)

The Indiana law gives the judge 14 days to decide whether to *return* the gun to a person police decided was at extreme risk. The first red flag law in the United States, however—passed in Connecticut in 1999—gave 14 days to judges to decide whether to *allow police to seize* the weapons before they did so (Conn. Gen. Stat. 1999, cited in Swanson et al. 2017). With requirements to have multiple officers sign a statement recommending removal, the requirements *de jure* reportedly led to minimal use of the law by the police (Swanson et al. 2017). Upon closer examination, however, some officers (in some agencies) found ways to create a *de facto* practice that evolved in Connecticut to include a seize-guns-first-go-to-court-later strategy, as described in a major study of that law (Swanson et al. 2017, 198):

> [A Connecticut] police supervisor explained how [Connecticut] police officers often circumvented the risk-warrant process out of an immediate concern for safety at the scene. In pressing circumstances, it seems that police have other justifications for removing guns, and may need the risk-warrant only to continue holding the weapons once the immediate risk of the scene has passed [as the officer explained to the authors, in his own words, quoted as follows]:
>
> *The process of obtaining control over firearms [can] happen very quickly . . . in the absence of a warrant, as a matter of fact. It can happen that way. What we end up doing is following up with one of these warrants [after seizing the guns], and then we serve it on ourselves, basically. We serve it on the caretaker of the records department. She has control of the guns once we get them here, and we end up serving her with the warrant. And then that starts the documentation of what we did. . . . "This is what we seized as a result of this warrant," and then we file it with the court. . . . We are at that point compelled to complete the return of service, provide the copy of the entire thing to the subject of the warrant. Our guy is going to be locked up in evaluation at that point in time. . . . So we have to go to the civil court clerk . . . and so the civil clerk would get a copy of our warrant now. They stamp the receiving of the warrant, and create a record, where the*

individual who is the subject of the warrant now gets notification that in two weeks, this day, you're going to have a hearing about these guns.

Regarding the *de jure* problem of delay in obtaining a gun seizure warrant, Swanson and colleagues (2017, 207) concluded that it could be solved by a relatively simple legislative amendment: "to allow police to remove guns immediately with probable cause; this would be similar to current practice in domestic violence situations where a gun surrender requirement is triggered by an ex parte temporary order of protection."

Is there an impact of red flag laws on fatal police shootings?

There is apparently no direct evidence of an effect of any kind of red flag laws on fatal police shootings. There are, in fact, many known cases of police officers killing, or being killed by, persons from whom they are trying to seize weapons lawfully. There is a clear possibility that more red flag laws may increase the number of violent encounters between police and citizens. Why, then, should this policy proposal top this article's list of things that can be done quickly to reduce the count of unnecessary fatal police shootings?

There are three reasons to make this recommendation. The first is that there is some evidence that such laws have reduced suicides. Swanson and colleagues (2017, 204, Table 2) estimated that even with Connecticut's de facto approximation of Indiana's *de jure* police powers of immediate gun seizure, the Connecticut law prevented one suicide death per 10.6 gun seizures. Kivisto and Phalen (2018) estimated that the Connecticut law reduced the firearms suicide rate by 13.7 percent after its implementation (number of gun seizures) rose substantially following the Virginia Tech mass murder in 2007. They also estimated that the Indiana law reduced firearms suicide by 7.5 percent in the 10 years after enactment. This evidence is weak, especially in relation to the question of the proportion of opportunities police had to use the laws in which they actually seized the guns. Yet if there are fewer *repeat* encounters of police with mentally troubled people with guns, there may well be fewer encounters in which someone dies—as in the Jake Laird case.

A second reason to promote red flag laws as a solution to fatal police shootings of citizens is that, as Daniel Nagin's article in this volume shows, the rate of fatal police shootings is strongly correlated, across all fifty states, with the use of guns for suicide. As of 2015 through 2018, with the red flag laws in both Connecticut and Indiana, Nagin shows that the rate of fatal police shootings per ten thousand residents is lower than predicted in both states—and substantially so in Connecticut. While many other factors could explain that variance, it is at least consistent with the hypothesis that such laws could reduce fatal police shootings.

A third reason to promote red flag laws as a leading policy response is the broad political support that the idea has attracted, even in states as conservative as Indiana. Nationally, public opinion polls have found high levels of public support for such laws. A PBS News Hour poll (Santhanam 2019), for example, found that 72 percent of Americans supported the passage of a federal red flag law,

while 23 percent were opposed. A national poll of registered voters a year earlier (DeBonis and Guskin 2018) reported that 71 percent "strongly supported" the passage of laws that would "allow the police to take guns away from people who have been found by a judge to be a danger to themselves or others." The idea of identifying "dangerous people with guns" seems to cut across the usual gun control divide. Given the role of gun density in shaping the rates of fatal police shootings, it seems to be in everyone's interest to use this leverage for change—as long as it does not backfire when police start taking guns away.

Hence the third reason for this proposal must be qualified by the need for more evidence. That evidence can come from the second proposal in this article.

Preventing Systems Crashes

As David Klinger's article in this volume observes, there are immense complexities in police systems that can "cascade" into a narrowing of options for police to protect themselves other than shooting someone. Those systems are not the fault of the police officer, nor of the citizen. They are the responsibility of the governments that create police agencies, especially—as Franklin Zimring's article spells out—the state governments. Yet the design of better policing systems is not something at which states are skilled (Sherman 2015). That is why Zimring focused on a modest, federally funded research and development effort as the fastest way to save lives. As Laurie Robinson points out in her commentary, there are good reasons to question the practical impact of this idea. Yet Klinger's article provides a way to shape its focus, which would be all-important for its success.

To take "normal accident theory" (NAT) seriously, it would need to be tested in field experiments. There is no shortage of hypotheses about how to slow down the decision-making that results in fatal police shootings (Klinger 2005, this volume; Sherman 2018). The shortage we confront is a lack of research. Take, for example, the hypothesis advanced four decades ago by Albert J. Reiss, Jr., in *The ANNALS* (1980). His claim was that systems of supervisory oversight for high-speed chases could be applied, with life-saving results, to supervisory oversight of specified police-citizen encounters. This claim seems all the stronger with new technology, especially the potential for on-scene body cameras to transmit real-time images to supervisors in a police command center. Rather than accepting that "no one is in command" at a police encounter, Reiss suggested that a command and control system could be established at a wide range of police-citizen encounters.

This idea, while only one of many innovations that could be field tested in police agencies willing to work with the National Institute of Justice, is one that can be applied directly to the most recent U.S. Supreme Court case on police use of deadly force. This case allowed a police officer to decide to shoot someone solely on the individual officer's discretion, in the presence of other officers who did not shoot—and then pronounced the decision as unreviewable by the federal courts.

The need for supervisory review in cases may be clearest—as Reiss (1980) discussed—where no one is actively shooting, but someone is not responding to

police orders to drop a knife. Indeed, Reiss's article in *The ANNALS*, and his proposal for radio-linked supervisory approval for decisions to shoot, almost directly anticipated the facts in this recent Supreme Court ruling (*Kisela v. Hughes* 2018). As the facts in that case were described in the order of the Supreme Court,

> In May 2010, somebody in Hughes' neighborhood called 911 to report that a woman was hacking a tree with a kitchen knife. Kisela and another police officer, Alex Garcia, heard about the report over the radio in their patrol car and responded. A few minutes later the person who had called 911 flagged down the officers; gave them a description of the woman with the knife; and told them the woman had been acting erratically. About the same time, a third police officer, Lindsay Kunz, arrived on her bicycle.
>
> Garcia spotted a woman, later identified as Sharon Chadwick, standing next to a car in the driveway of a nearby house. A chain-link fence with a locked gate separated Chadwick from the officers. The officers then saw another woman, Hughes, emerge from the house carrying a large knife at her side. Hughes matched the description of the woman who had been seen hacking a tree. Hughes walked toward Chadwick and stopped no more than six feet from her. All three officers drew their guns. At least twice they told Hughes to drop the knife. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Hughes, Chadwick said "take it easy" to both Hughes and the officers. Hughes appeared calm, but she did not acknowledge the officers' presence or drop the knife. The top bar of the chain-link fence blocked Kisela's line of fire, so he dropped to the ground and shot Hughes four times through the fence. Then the officers jumped the fence, handcuffed Hughes, and called paramedics, who transported her to a hospital. There she was treated for non-life-threatening injuries. Less than a minute had transpired from the moment the officers saw Chadwick to the moment Kisela fired shots.

In this case, seven judges of the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeal, which had reversed a lower court's decision to dismiss a constitutional challenge to Kisela's shooting of Hughes; the highest court upheld the lowest, declaring once again that "split second decisions" are unreviewable. Professor Reiss did not claim they were reviewable by a court *ex post facto*. He claimed they were reviewable in advance. The "better systems" proposal of this article does not lie at the boundary of lawful use of force. It depends on finding ways to protect lives.

The Supreme Court said that the shooting was "lawful." Yet many observers consider that shooting to have been "awful"—or at least avoidable. What is clear from the Court's summary is how quickly it all happened. The Court went on to note that

> all three of the officers later said that at the time of the shooting they subjectively believed Hughes to be a threat to Chadwick. After the shooting, the officers discovered that Chadwick and Hughes were roommates, that Hughes had a history of mental illness, and that Hughes had been upset with Chadwick over a $20 debt.

What is not clear to the public is whether this threat had to be resolved by immediate gunfire, or whether some other systems could have been in place to avoid a shoot-or-not decision as the only two alternatives. That question cannot be resolved through mere speculation and hypothetical discussion. But it can be resolved by the development and testing of systems for providing alternative ways to protect life.

As Reiss (1980) suggested, there could, in such situations, be a threshold for engaging supervisory oversight. The report of a woman carrying a kitchen knife would fit under a threshold of "carrying a lethal weapon in public"—just as it would have when the fatal encounter with Officer Jake Laird began in Indianapolis. Events of that description are rare enough so that there would not be a huge burden on supervisory time—especially in comparison to the cost of litigating a police decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, or even a state court. Had a supervisor been linked to the body camera of the Tucson officer, the supervisor might have ordered all officers at the scene by radio to "prepare to use your Taser," or use pepper-spray, or a net-gun, or any other less-lethal weaponry. The decision would then be in the supervisor's hands, and not subject to the judgment of any one officer at the scene.

Comparing the shooting of Ms. Hughes by Officer Kisela to the shootings discussed in the article in this volume by Greg Ridgeway, it is important to note that only Kisela fired a gun. Neither Officer Garcia nor Officer Kunz fired their guns. Perhaps they would have if Kisela had not; that is speculation. But it is not speculation to say that Kisela was not in "command" of the situation. No one was. All three officers were coequal in rank. All three had equal powers under law to shoot. That is the system by which the State of Arizona authorizes police officers to kill people. No system existed in Tucson, or in most other U.S. police agencies, to engage a supervisor in a life-and-death decision.

Any proposal of an option to engage a supervisor in such a confrontation would be immediately criticized for a lack of time. Events moved too fast, it would be said, to connect to anyone at headquarters, let alone to call a sergeant to the scene. Yet this is what "tight coupling" means: the lack of "slack" time between when an officer witnesses a threat and the decision to respond to the threat. Not all tight coupling can be loosened up. But training, policies, and discipline in relation to less-lethal weapons are among the ways to loosen the coupling of risk to a shooting. Reiss's proposal to engage a supervisor is only one possible option. Former Camden County Police Chief J. Scott Thomson used other options to discourage shootings when other weapons could be used (Sherman 2018).

Training alone could be tested for different levels of investment. With a randomized experiment, for example, all officers could be assigned to an initial one-day training course on disarming knife-carriers without shooting. A subset of those officers could be assigned to an annual refresher of such training, while the rest would not. Over 10 years or more, there may be sufficient statistical power to discern differences in weapons use. Or if multiple police agencies joined in an experiment with a sample of thousands of officers, an answer could be possible in an even shorter period of time. A similar approach could be taken with the kind of social interaction training described by Scott Wolfe and colleagues in this volume.

Yet the larger point about systems design can easily get lost in a discussion of specific programs, such as training, early-warning, or incident review systems. The core of systems crash avoidance is to map out the current systems, then compare them to possible alternatives. What is "possible" will face many subjective opinions. Yet the core of the problem is too much demand on policing, and

not enough time to meet it. Ultimately, the public as well as police must face a choice between "fast policing" of every 911 call to police, or "slow policing" with systems using big data to help predict lower and higher risks of harm. Even the use of rapid video response by an officer in a command center to a caller may be a form of "slow policing," if it saves thousands of hours of police time wasted in driving to locations where the caller has already departed.

The kind of solutions that David Klinger suggests cannot be implemented overnight. Yet there is every reason to invest in the long run. What can happen in the short run is, potentially, some early breakthroughs in systems design that would save lives quickly. One example, with the facts of *Kisela v. Hughes* (2018), would be the adoption of a knife-encounter protocol. This would be a technology-enabled set of procedures for disarming anyone posing a threat with a knife that would use alternatives to firearms. If that assignment was given to an experienced SWAT team with a large budget for less-lethal weapons, there is good reason to believe that the SWAT team could develop such a protocol. And if a SWAT team were to train other officers in the protocol, the other officers might take that training seriously.

To Stop the Bleeding

Of all the ideas about reducing lives lost in police-citizen encounters, one stands out as producing the most immediate benefits. It is, in fact, the prime example of a redesigned police system. That idea is the implementation of immediate police provision of maximum first aid to all persons shot or stabbed, regardless of who was wounded or why. The idea might have prevented the prosecution of an Oklahoma police officer who stood by with her colleagues doing nothing after shooting an unarmed man (Sherman 2018). It might save the lives of many wounded police officers. It might also focus attention on the need to provide better trauma care in the trauma "deserts" where, Daniel Nagin shows in this volume, fatal police encounters are more frequent compared to states with better access to trauma care.

As Sara Jacoby and colleagues show in this volume, the research is not strong on whether deaths are reduced when police "scoop and run" a victim of a stabbing or gunshot wound to a hospital. Yet the technique remains encouraging. So does the prospect of training more police officers in the techniques taught to more than one million citizens for dealing with gunshot wounds—the "Stop the Bleed" program, sponsored by the American College of Surgeons,[1] has trained ordinary citizens in using tourniquets and other battlefield-tested equipment, and those trained have already saved many lives in mass-shooting events, such as the Synagogue slaughter in Pittsburgh (P. Williams 2019). In the latter case, they even saved the life of the mass shooter, despite some reluctance to do so while his dead victims lay around him.

This is precisely the issue that Trinidad Police Commissioner Stephen Williams addressed in 2014 when he boldly equipped more than two hundred

police cars with first aid kits and hemostatic bandages for treating anyone bleeding profusely, including those shot by police officers. There were many objections raised by the officers at the time, including fear of being sued for malpractice of medicine—even with assurances in police orders that they would never be held liable for using first aid. Yet the most emotionally powerful objection was that they did not want the people they had shot to live. Having worked through frequent shots fired at police cars, they saw the people they shot as a threat to them, much as Jake Laird's killer was a threat to police after they had to give the killer his guns back. The issue of police medically treating people they have just shot is not an easy one. But it is necessary to reduce the number of fatal shootings in the United States each year.

The people who police would treat in a system that requires "Stop the Bleed" treatment would overwhelmingly be crime and accident victims. The beneficial effects of such actions on police legitimacy would be substantial. Thousands of families could point to a police car and say, "They saved my daughter's life." For every person killed by police, there would be many more whose lives were saved by police.

Yet the question of whether police should apply these methods, or just drive victims to a hospital, or—like the Oklahoma City case and the *Kisela v. Hughes* case—do nothing except call for medical treatment is still to be addressed. More research is needed to determine which policy would work best in different kinds of communities. But the kind of research that is needed is experimental, not descriptive. We cannot answer these questions without substantial investments in first aid kits and police training. Those investments, in turn, need to be linked to randomized clinical trials, or at least strongly matched control groups. We can learn rapidly only by doing rapidly.

That, in the end, is how this volume comes together. By examining the problem from so many different perspectives, the authors have created a new and distinct perspective. They have collectively helped us to think about what to do next, and with what priority. While they may not agree with each other, they might all agree on the benefits of field testing ways to "Stop the Bleed" once people are shot or stabbed. Such a proposal would be anything but a zero-sum game. This is a proposal to save lives of victims, police, and offenders. The professional duty to defend life does not discriminate.

The tragic choice of this final article is the disservice it does to the many other ideas and insights in this volume. The rhetorical decision to focus on three clear ideas that can be widely explained—and perhaps adopted—comes at the great price of limiting attention to the other authors in the volume. There are many ideas in this volume worth serious attention, even though they are very unlikely to lead to policy changes. That, in fact, is the history of *The ANNALS*, which discussed labor unions, women's rights, and social security long before anyone considered them politically possible. So in skirting many other great ideas, such as daily mandatory alcohol testing for some offenders, or better early warning systems for officers at high risk of shooting "awfully" or even unlawfully, this article may miss the most important content in these pages.

The only mitigation this article can offer for the consequences of its focus is to direct the reader's attention back to the Table of Contents of the full volume, so

that anyone reading this online can at least see the full range of topics addressed in the volume. There is so much more in this volume that could be implemented, if scholars or activists were to put their backs into those ideas rather than only these ideas. Social science seems unable to predict major shifts in political culture, so it seems unwise to condemn any idea for a lack of feasibility. What the United States needs is more people thinking seriously, and hard, about the complex problems of reducing shootings by the police, of the police, and for all the policed.

Note

1. See https://www.stopthebleed.org/.

References

Ahmed, Azam. 20 December 2019. Where the police wear masks, and the bodies pile up fast. *New York Times*.

DeBonis, Mike, and Emily Guskin. 9 September 2018. Americans of both parties overwhelmingly support "red flag" laws, expanded background checks for gun buyers, Washington Post-ABC News poll finds. *Washington Post*.

Gettleman, Jeffrey. 21 December 2019. In India tech city shocked by gang rape, vigilante justice gets praise. *New York Times*.

Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018).

Kivisto, Aaron J., and Peter Lee Phalen. 2018. Effects of risk-based firearm seizure laws in Connecticut and Indiana on suicide rates, 1981–2015. *Psychiatric Services* 69:855–62.

Klinger, David. 2005. *Social theory and the street cop: The case of deadly force*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Mack, Justin L. 7 August 2019. Remembering Jake Laird, the officer whose death inspired Indiana's "red flag" law. *Indianapolis Star*. Available from https://eu.indystar.com.

Martin, Ryan. 6 August 2019. Here's what a red flag law is — and how it works in Indiana. *Indianapolis Star*. Available from https://eu.indystar.com.

Reiss, Albert J., Jr. 1980. Controlling police use of deadly force. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 452:122–34.

Santhanam, Laura. 10 September 2019. Most Americans support these 4 types of gun legislation, poll says. *PBS NewsHour*.

Sherman, Lawrence W. 24 February 2015. Statement to the Presidential Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Available from https://www.c-span.org/video/?324520-1/presidents-task-force-hearing-community-policing.

Sherman, Lawrence W. 2018. Reducing fatal police shootings as system crashes: Research, theory, and practice. *Annual Review of Criminology* 1:421–49.

Swanson, Jeffrey W., Michael A. Norko, Marhsiu-Ju Lin, Kelly Alanis-Hirsch, Linda K. Frisman, Madelon V. Baranoski, Michele M. Easter, Allison G. Robertson, Marvin S. Swartz, and Richard J. Bonnie. 2017. Implementation and effectiveness of Connecticut's risk-based gun removal law: Does it prevent suicides? *Law and Contemporary Problems* 80:179–208.

Williams, Paige. 1 April 2019. Turning bystanders into first responders. *The New Yorker*.

Williams, Timothy. 7 August 2019. What are "red flag" laws, and how do they work? *New York Times*.